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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A REEVALUATION
OF FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND THE
COMMERCE CLAUSE
I. Introduction
The legitimate concern of state and local governments to regain
control over environmental regulation in recent years has resulted
in a marked increase in conflicts with the commerce' and supre-
macy' clauses of the Constitution. Various criteria have been used
by the courts to determine violations of these Constitutional provi-
sions where environmental objectives are sought through local laws.
In the field of environmental litigation, traditional tests are con-
stantly challenged to meet the changing moral climate of the na-
tion.3
This Comment will weigh the valid desire of local legislatures for
more responsive environmental regulation against the federal goal
of uniform regulation and unrestrained interstate commerce. Where
Congress has enacted an environmental regulation, the supremacy
clause bars local entry in the area absent express permission.' The
commerce clause forbids the enactment of state and local regula-
tions in certain areas even in the absence of federal law.5 When a
local law is held to be exempt from federal pre-emption under the
supremacy clause, often it is also challenged on the grounds that the
local rule unduly restricts interstate commerce in violation of the
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress . . .shall have Power . . .to regulate
Commerce .. .among the several States .... " Id.
2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Id.
3. The following statements represent interpretations of the maxim "hard cases make bad
law:" "Hard cases are the quicksands of the law." Metropolitan Nat. Bank v. Campbell
Commission Co., 77 F. 705, 710 (C.C. W.D. Mo. 1896).
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by
reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts
the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled
principles of law will bend.
Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
4. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
5. See text accompanying note 155 infra.
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commerce clause.' Thus, these two Constitutional provisions are
inextricably intertwined.
II. General Concepts and Overview
A. The Police Power
The power to enact certain legislation is reserved to the states
under the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution
This power may be used to protect a variety of citizens' interests,
although it has been most extensively exercised in the area of
public health and welfare.' In the presence of federal legislation,
local regulation is valid provided it does not contravene the goals of
the federal legislation and does not violate the Constitution.,
The police power is not limited to the protection of the citizens'
rights to immediate health and safety. 0 The state may act to protect
the future economic or aesthetic welfare of its citizens." The scope
of environmental law includes many of these protected rights, for
example zoning ordinances, sewage disposal, and a host of other
regulations that fall under the larger classification of air, noise,
water, and land pollution.
6. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,
362 U.S. 440 (1960).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." Id. See note 8 infra.
8. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). "An attempt to define [the police power's]
reach or trace its outer limits is fruitless. . . . Public safety, public health, morality, peace
and quiet. . . these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the traditional application
of the police power to municipal affairs." Id. at 32.
9. There must be an "actual conflict." NOWAK, ROTuNDA, and YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CoNsTrrFioNAL LAw 267 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NowAK]. "The constitutional principles
of preemption, in whatever particular field of law they operate, are designed with a common
end in view: to avoid conflicting regulations of conduct by various official bodies which
might have some authority over the subject matter." Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry.
& Motor Coach Employees of American v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1971).
10. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
11. "The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and compre-
hends the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquillity
of a community." Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949). "The concept of public welfare
is broad and inclusive . . . . The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aes-
thetic as well as monetary." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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B. Federal and Local Motives in Enacting Environmental
Legislation
State or local legislation directed at environmental concerns is
often prompted by (1) absence of federal legislation dealing with the
problem, 2 (2) federal legislation not on point with local concerns, 3
or (3) federal legislation inadequate to eradicate the problem to the
extent envisioned by the state."
The motivation behind most local environmental legislation may
be traced to a desire to preserve a scarce natural resource situated
within the locality and to reduce or forestall the added cost of restor-
ing or finding an alternative to the resource. 5 The judicial deter-
mination of a motive's validity is in a state of transition. Recently,
the United States Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that the motive
for the state legislation is irrelevant."
A prerequisite for supremacy clause pre-emption as discussed in
this Comment is the existence of a federal law."7 The motivation for
Congressional action in' the field of environmental law is an integral
element of a court's determination of pre-emption. The many facili-
ties and functions exclusively within the control of Congress and the
commitment made by it to the goal of a clean and healthy environ-
12. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)(landfill utilization);
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911)(protection of oil resources).
. 13. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)(federal
imposition of no-fault liability on producers of oil spill covers only cost of federal, not state
cleanup).
14. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978)(oil spill prevention); City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)(airport noise pollution);
British Airways v. Port Authority, 10 ERC 1216 (2d Cir. 1977)(airport noise pollution); Ameri-
can Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973)(federal
"Pitch In to Clean Up America" campaign had no appreciable effect on highway litter).
15. Freilich, 1977-78 Annual Review of Local Government Law: Judicial and Constitu-
tional Intervention in Municipal Fiscal Affairs,. 10 URB. LAw. 573, 613 (1978).
16. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). "[W]e assume New
Jersey has every right to protect its' residents' pocketbooks as well as their environment."
Id. at 626. The Court's conclusion on this point was not crucial to the decision. The in-
validity of the New Jersey statute was assured by its discriminatory nature. Id. at 626-27.
See note 191 supra. Shortly before making this broad statement, the Court stated "[t]his
dispute about ultimate legislative purpose need not be resolved, because its resolution would
not be relevant to the constitutional issue to be decided in this case." 437 U.S. at 626.
17. Under the supremacy clause, the Constitution may also pre-empt local regulation
without the presence of federal law. Neel, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption,
5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 563, 578 (1978). Treaties are also granted supremacy. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941).
19791
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
ment arguably make Congress best suited to act in this field.' s Legit-
imate interests of local governments may conflict with those of Con-
gress either in purpose or operation.'" To alleviate this problem,
attempts to unite local and federal legislation under the concept of
cooperative federalism have been suggested.20 Neither federal nor
local governments wish to relinquish their interest or power to act
in this area; yet, both recognize the necessity of cooperation and
consistent regulation.2'
C. State Regulation Violative of the Commerce Clause
In the absence of federal legislation, local environmental law may
be held invalid if it violates the commerce clause. 2 A court will
apply three distinct tests to determine whether a state has exceeded
judicially imposed boundaries. The hierarchy of these tests is often
crucial to the ultimate decision. First, the court will examine the
area being regulated and determine if there is a, need for uniform
federal regulations.23 Second, the court will search for any sign of
discrimination against interstate commerce24 A corollary of this test
18. "The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrela-
tions of all components of the natural environment, . . declares that it is the continuing
policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and local governments, . . . to
use all practicable means and measures . . . to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans." National Environmental Pol-
icy Act of 1969, § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1976) (emphasis added).
19. "Conflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress has erected
as conflict in overt policy." Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elect. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees
of America v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971). Legitimate "superior authority" is the sine
qua non of federal pre-emption. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941). A general test
would seem to be whether the local "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. at 67.
20. Freilich, 1977-78 Annual Review of Local Government Law: Judicial and Constitu-
tional Intervention in Municipal Fiscal Affairs, 10 UnB. LAw. 573, 606 (1978). "Congress has
generally given a new twist to the concept of federalism by assigning to the federal govern-
ment the responsibility for setting substantive environmental quality standards and by as-
signing to the states the responsibility for implementing and enforcing those standards."
Sherrod, Introductory Survey-1977, 8 ENVIR. L. Rav. ix, xxvii (1977).
21. The concession of this rather obvious point may be crucial to the outcome of the
litigation. A state's admission of a federal interest in airspace management'was characterized
as a "fatal concession" for purposes of a finding of pre-emption. City of Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See note 1 supra.
23. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298, 318-19 (1851); Neel, Ray
v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. at 569.
24. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626-27.
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is that no state may isolate itself from the problems of other states.5
A positive determination under either of the first two criteria will
summarily invalidate the.offending legislation."2
. If the legislation is neither in a uniform area nor discriminatory,
a balancing test is applied. Under this test, the benefit to the com-
munity is weighed against the burden on interstate commerce.27 In
purely commerce-related cases, the weighing test is relatively sim-
ple to apply; however, in environmental law, the issue is usually not
one of relative cost, but one of contrast between a comercially-
recognizable burden and a non-comparable benefit. 28 The right of a
court to rebalance interests once a local legislature has decided that
a certain resource supplies a benefit outweighing any given form of
commerce has been questioned.29 Some writers maintain that the
balancing test encroaches upon traditional legislative powers and
that judicial review of state or local legislation under the commerce
clause should be limited to the need for uniformity and discrimina-
tion tests 0
In cases where the resource represents a non-comparable benefit,
the Supreme Court has concluded that the balancing test is impro-
perly applied when used to invalidate local legislation under the
commerce clause.3 ' It may be that no piece of local legislation can
fail a balancing test under the commerce clause since by nature,
environmental objectives are non-comparable. At the other ex-
treme, there are interpretations of the balancing test that assign to
every environmental benefit an economically quantified value.
III. Federal Pre-emption
A. General Construction and Local Motivation
Under the supremacy clause,3 2 local legislation is pre-empted if it
25. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
26. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
27. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
28. See note 214 infra. A non-comparable benefit is a term of art for the psychic benefits
prevalent in the field of environmental law.
29. Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 138-39 (1968). See text accompa-
nying note 210 infra.
30. See note 217 infra.
31. 393 U.S. at 136. See generally C. DucAT, MODES OF CONSTTTnONAL INTERETATION
116-92 (1978).
32. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. See note,2 supra.
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conflicts with the purpose of a federal act.33 This may be based upon
express language of pre-emption in the federal law. 34 Other bases for
pre-emption are Congressional intent,35 federal action31 or a federal
decision not to act in the field. 7 Thus, a major task faced by local
legislators is determining whether federal legislation in a given area
was intended to exclude all local regulation.
38
Conflict exists between local and federal government in the field
of environmental law.3 The federal government and the business
community validly desire uniformity of regulation."0 The states have
33. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
34. Neel, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield: A Case of Preemption, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. at
578 (1978). For example, the Copyright Act of 1976, section 101 states: "On and after Janu-
ary 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified . . . are governed exclusively by this title.
Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under
the common law of statutes of any State." 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1976).
35. However, "[tihere is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot
be-any rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the
meaning and purpose of every act of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
36. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978).
37. "It is often a perplexing question whether Congress has precluded state action or by
the choice of selective regulatory measures has left the police power of the States undisturbed
except as the state and federal regulations collide." Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230-31 (1947).
38. Decisions by the Supreme Court in this area do not follow a logical or consistent
pattern. Prior cases show "an unprincipled quality, seemingly bereft of any consistent doc-
trinal basis." Note, The Pre-emption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 624 (1975). General guidelines were set forth in Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Chief Justice Warren considered essential to a finding
of pre-emption a pervasive federal regulatory scheme, a strong link between the federal law
and a dominant federal interest, and a "serious danger of conflict with the administration of
the federal program." Id. at 502-05.
39. See American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 625-26,
517 P.2d 691, 696 (1973). American Can Co. complained that creation of recycling centers and
reorganization of factories precipitated by a ban on "no-deposit bottles and pull-top cans"
would drive up costs and result in higher prices. A comparable situation arose in Procter and
Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 7 ERC 1328 (7th Cir. 1975), where the company had only
one warehouse for Chicago and its suburbs. Following Chicago's ban on phosphate detergents,
the company was forced to choose between creating a separate warehouse and delivery system
for its suburban customers (not affected by the Chicago ordinance) or denying them access
to phosphate detergents.
40. See Sherrod, Introductory Survey-1977, 8 ENvIR. L. REv. at ix-xi. But see W.
ANrREws, ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUtMON 115 (1972). A test in New York City was reported therein
which concluded that air pollution had a decided impact on worker productivity. Workers in
offices within 100 feet of heavily trafficked thoroughfares were subject to levels of carbon
monoxide three times higher than normal. The implied conclusion is that these workers might
have been consistently drowsy or accident-prone. Clearly business interests would benefit
from selective environmental regulation abating such emissions of carbon monoxide.
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an interest in creating their own environmental legislation since the
federal government often moves slowly,"' and, once it has acted,
cannot be expected to tailor legislation to meet the needs of each
individual area of the country.2
A primary factor in a court's analysis is the intent of Congress in
enacting legislation within a given field. 3 Many considerations, in-
cluding the need for uniform regulation, are involved; however, this
"need" is technically insufficient to support a supremacy clause
attack. Congressional intent to exclude local legislation must also
be apparent. Admittedly, the distinction is blurred, but the need for
a uniform rule is more appropriate to support an alleged commerce
clause violation."
A determination of pre-emption is facilitated where Congress has
addressed the issue of local action. A court will generally accept an
express pre-emption clause as adequate evidence of Congressional
intent.45 If Congress has expressly allowed local legislation to coex-
ist, the issue becomes whether the local regulation has contravened
the operation of the federal act" or has exceeded the power dele-
41. See, e.g., Weisman, US. and New York Agree on Disposing of Nuclear Wastes, N.Y.
Times, March 21, 1979, §A, at 1, col. 3. The federal government "agreed to accept responsi-
bility" for disposal of highly radioactive nuclear waste, responding to pleas from New York
extending over a year. Id. Following a well-publicized nuclear accident in Pennsylvania, the
Governor of New York "backed out" of the agreement. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1979, §E, at 3,
col. 1.
42. The policy statement of the National Environment Policy Act declares that environ-
mental policy will be created "in cooperation with the State and local governments. .. ."
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1976). See note 18 supra. In practice, federal law often runs counter to
local environmental policy.
43. An examination of legislative history aimed at ascertaining "the clear and manifest
'purpose of Congress" was used in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624, 634-38 (1973) to determine the existence of federal pre-emption. This procedure was
criticized. Warren, Airport Noise Regulation, 8 Taisp. L.J. 403, 408-09 (1976). See Rice v.
Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
44. "The interdependence of these factors requires a uniform and exclusive system of
federal regulation if the congressional objectives .... are to be fulfilled." City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973).
45. Prior to examining legislative documents, the Court noted the lack of an express pre-
emption clause. Although the lack of an express pre-emption clause is "not decisive," the
Court implied that its presence might well be. Id. at 633. See Murphy & La Pierre, Nuclear
Moratorium Legislation in the States and the Supremacy Clause: A Case for Express Pre-
emption, 8 ENvIR. L. REV. 233 (1977).
46. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). The Court
quickly concluded that the federal statute permitted state action. Id., at 329, but compared
the statutes to positively determine lack of conflict. Id. at 330-37. The Court would allow
the state law to stand only "in the absence of federal pre-emption and any fatal conflict be-
tween the statutory schemes." Id. at 337 (emphasis added). Thus neither express tolerance
19791
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gated to local government.'7 Most Congressional action now may be
categorized as either express tolerance or express pre-emption.
Rarely does Congress now enact a law omitting treatment of local
action.
B. Implied Pre-emption
Where Congress has not addressed the issue of pre-emption in the
federal law, a court may find implied pre-emption. based on Con-
gressional intent, as exhibited in either the legislative history of the
act or in the nature of the federal regulation. An exceptionally clear
example of implied pre-emption of a local ordinance by comprehen-
sive federal legislation was presented in City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, Inc.'"
The city of Burbank was pre-empted from enforcing an ordi-
nance'" banning "pure-jet" departures and landings during the
night. Although the purpose of this ordinance was to spare Burbank
residents the discomfort of jet-aircraft noise during the night, the
ban was found not to be the proper remedy given the large amount
of federal legislation in this field, some specifically directed at this
form of pollution.0 The Burbank ordinance was held to directly
contravene the intent of Congress as inferred from federal legisla-
tion.'
The local legislation was held to frustrate both the purpose and
operation of the Federal Aviation Act.5" The most elemental inter-
pretation of the supremacy clause would not permit such an ordi-
nance given the pervasive occupation of the field by the federal
of state or local action nor lack of an express pre-emption provision by Congress is conclusive
evidence of pre-emption in and of itself. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co;, 435 U.S. 151, 158
(1978).
47. See Union Electric Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)
discussed at note 90 infra.
48. 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
49. Burbank Municipal Code § 20-32.1.
50. 411 U.S. at 629 (1973) See Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d
812 (2d Cir. 1956)(altitude regulation); American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272
F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), affl'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968)(limiting noise spectra).
51. 411 U.S. at 638. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976); Noise Control
Act of 1972 (amended 49 U.S.C. § 1431(b)(1) (1970 Supp. II)).
52. 411 U.S. at 639. Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971). See note 19 supra. See also Note, Federal Pre-emption
and Airport Noise Control, 8 Urn. L. ANN. 229 (1974). The ultimate solution would seem to
reside with the Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 239.
[Vol. VII
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government. 53 The Supreme Court, examining the legislative history
of the Noise Control Act, noted the intent of Congress to act before
local legislature enacted noise control statutes." Burbank conceded
that the field of airspace management was already occupied by the
federal government in the form of the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion. This concession was "fatal." 55
The practical effect of the supremacy clause is to avoid the fric-
tion that might occur between local and federal legislatures if both
were permitted to act concurrently in all fields. 56 The situation in
Lockheed stands as an example of the potential havoc created when
a field demanding a uniform rule is invaded by local legislation.
"The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an
elaborate and detailed system of controls, '."57 making any local regu-
lation highly disruptive of the goal of federal legislation and a seri-
ous threat to the safety and control necessary for any organized
system of airspace management." However, Congress may pre-empt
state regulation without showing an actual need for uniform rule.5
Lockheed is illustrative of the varied bases upon which a determi-
nation of pre-emption may be upheld. Certain environmental prob-
lems of direct concern to local residents must be treated exclusively
53. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973); Pennsyl-
vania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502 (1956).
54. 411 U.S. at 636-37.
55. Id. at 628-29. In British Airways v. Port Authority, 10 ERC 1216 (2d Cir. 1977) a
holding that the Port Authority was pre-empted from banning the British-French supersonic
airplane because the Secretary of Transportation specified regulations on takeoff direction,
entries and departures (eight per day) and promulgated a strict nighttime ban, was reversed
by the Court of Appeals, based on the Secretary's subsequent statement that the Port Author-
ity had the power to ban the jets.
If, however, local action conflicts with federal legislation in operation not in purpose, and
the local law makes compliance with federal regulations impossible then pre-emption occurs.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
56. See W. MILLER, A NEw HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 118-22 (1968)(discussion of the
problems confronted by the Articles of Confederation). "This principle, the supremacy of the
Body-politic as constitution-maker and the subordination of the government as the delegated
agent of the Body-politic, with no powers but those derived from the Body-politic by virtue
of the constitution, is therefore the foundation of American Constitutional Law." 1 J. TUCKER,
THE CONsTrrurON OF THE UNIrED STATES § 54, at 666 (1899).
57. 411 U.S. at 634 (quoting Northwest Airlines,. Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
58. 411 U.S. at 639. The public interest includes "[t]he regulation of air transportation
in such a manner as to assure the highest degree of safety. . . .49 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1976).
59. See text accompanying notes 122-29 infra. The intention of Congress to create
uniform rules should be distinguished from a situation in which there is an inherent need for
uniform regulation. See generally Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a
State Choice Pre-empted?, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 679, 690-91 (1979).
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by the federal government in spite of the lack of an express state-
ment of pre-emption on the part of Congress. Thus, the court will
look to the nature of the subject being regulated, discussions in
Congress prior to enactment of the federal act, and the structure of
the act to determine whether pre-emption may be inferred.'
Though courts habitually engage in such examination, writers often
limit the holding of Lockheed to the theory that comprehensive
federal legislation impliedly pre-empted the local ordinance.2
"What the ultimate remedy may be for aircraft noise which
plagues many communities and tens of thousands of people is not
know." 3 Pre-emption may exist even where the comprehensive fed-
eral legislation is working slowly, and affording little, if any, relief."
C. Express Tolerance of Local Legislation
1. Harsher Penalties on Similar Subjects
Once federal law has recognized local governments' right to act
in an area concerning the environment, pre-emption may exist if the
local law conflicts with the actual operation of the federal legisla-
tion. The local legislature may exceed the limits Congress had antic-
ipated, but not expressly delineated, by enacting an extraordinarily
harsh penalty. Pre-emption might also arise if the local penalty is
no more severe than Congress had anticipated, but is applied in far
broader scope than the the federal government might consider ap-
propriate.
For the protection of its citizens' health, Detroit enacted a Smoke
Abatement Code that extended to ships docked in its harbor. 5 Ships
entering the harbor with a tug escort experienced no conflict with
the law" but ships running their engines to operate deck machinery
while in port emitted smoke in violation of the Smoke Abatement
Code .
60. NowAK, supra note'9, at 628.
61. 411 U.S. at 634-37.
62. Id. at 633. See Federal Pre-emption and Noise Control, 8 URB. L. ANN. 229, 235 (1974)
(modem tendency to use narrow grounds for pre-emption); But see Note, Airport Noise
Regulation: Burbank, Aaron and Air Transport, 8 TRANP. L.J. 403, 410-11 (1976) for other
interpretations of Lockheed.
63. 411 U.S. at 638.
64. Id. See Note, Federal Pre-emption and Noise Control, 8 URB. L. ANN. 229, 239 (1974).
65. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960).




The pre-emption question arose in connection with ship inspec-
tion requirements imposed by the federal government.8 The same
engines in need of extensive structural modification for allegedly
polluting Detroit's air were previously approved and licenses by the
federal government."' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit
held the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code not pre-empted despite
extensive federal regulation of the subject matter.
Congress had expressly recognized the necessity of having local
legislation attack the problem of air pollution.70 Additionally, no
conflict existed since federal design requirements were enacted to
ensure safe passage7 while the Smoke Abatement Code was enacted
to protect the health of Detroit's citizens. 2 The Court placed no
importance upon the similarities of the penalties imposed by each.73
Thus, a local ordinance may penalize and regulate an environmen-
tally offensive agent provided no express limitation appears in the
federal act granting power to the localities although the effect of
another federal law seems to be impaired.
Lockheed and Huron represent opposite extremes in the field of
pre-emption. Lockheed declared coexistence between federal and
local legislation impossible because the federal regulatory scheme
was pervasive. 4 In Huron, Congressional intent clearly tolerated
local regulation in the field of air pollution reduction. Moreover, the
Detroit ordinance did not in fact contravene the goals, of federal
ship licensing.7 Clearly, forcing a ship to replace its engines may
work as great an inconvenience as a total ban on polluting ships.
However, the strength of a local ordinance, though significant, is not
68. 46 U.S.C. §§ 391(a),(b) (mandatory hull and equipment standards §§ 392(b),(c),(d)
(annual inspection requirements).
69. Id. at 447.
70. Id. at 445-46, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970) The policy statement of the Air Pollu-
tion Prevention and Control Act now states: "The Congress finds-. . . (3) that the preven-
tion and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments. . . .42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1976).
71. 362 U.S. at 445. The Coast Guard is required to inspect vessels to determine that they
are suitable for navigation with both safe and fit accommodations. 46 U.S.C. § 391(a) (1970).
The statute nowhere alludes to the elimination of polluting devices as a goal of the inspection.
72. 362 U.S. at 445.
73. Although Detroit imposed criminal penalties, id. at 441, and federal law provides for
revocation of inspection certificates, 46 U.S.C. § 391(d) (1970), shipowners must repair or
replace the offending engines to avoid conflict with either law.
74. 411 U.S. at 633. See also Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
75. 362 U.S. at 447. See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504 (1956).
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conclusive. Actual conflict must be shown before a local law will be
pre-empted on this ground."
2. Penalty Applied in Excessive Scope
A federal law may authorize localities to enact a specific penalty
but neglect to describe those to whom the penalty shall apply. A
local law may be challenged on federal pre-emption grounds if it
manipulates this vagueness to impose broader penalties than antici-
pated by the federal government.
The issue of authorized penalty applied in excessive breadth
under the state act was examined in Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc." wherein the Florida Oil Spill Prevention and Pollu-
tion Control Act's was found not to be pre-empted by the federal
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970.11 Oil spillage is "an insidi-
ous form of pollution of vast concern to every coastal city or port and
to all the estuaries on which the life of the ocean and the lives of
the coastal people are greatly dependent."" Congress intended oil
spills to be cleared away by a joint federal-state cleanup force. As
in Huron, Congress allowed the states to enact legislation to impose
additional liability upon the oil companies and to underwrite the
cost of their share of the venture.8 To test the reasonableness of the
76. See note 9 supra. But see Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). The test
for pre-emption, using the standard that "enforcement of the state. . . acts presents a serious
danger of conflict," has been interpreted as necessitating at least a probably conflict rather
than a mere possibility. Since the Court refuses to adjudicate non-controversies, Ashwander
v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324 (1936), there is little chance of this point
being further refined.
77. 411 U.S. 325 (1978).
78. 1970 Fla. Laws c. 70-244 (establishing no-fault liability against vessels and on-shore
facilities to pay for state cleanup costs and damage to property and business caused by oil
spills).
79. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970) as amended by Water Pollution Prevention and Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976). "It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976). See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) (1976),
formerly 33 U.S.C. § 1161(o)(2) (1970): "Nothing in this section shall be construed as pre-
empting any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability
with respect to the discharge of oil or hazardous substance into any waters within such State."
(wording added since 1973 italicized). The federal act establishes no-fault liability against
vessels to recover costs incurred by the federal government in cleaning up oil spills. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1161 (1970).
80. Id. at 328-29.
81. Id. at 335-36. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321
(c)(1,2) (1976) authorized the President to create and publish a National Contingency Plan
to deal with oil and hazardous substance removal within sixty days of October 18, 1972. Such
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Florida Act, the Court examined the growth in size of modem tank-
ers and the corresponding growth of oil spills in recent years." The
Water Quality Improvement Act never touched on the issue of com-
pensation for damage to waterfront areas."3 The imposition of re-
sponsibility for the destruction of Florida's tourist, trade, fishing
industry and natural wildlife was not unreasonable and remained
open to state legislation. The Florida law was allowed to stand not
solely because the federal statute expressly provided for tolerance
of state regulation,8' but because it was crucial to the environment85
and did not contravene the purpose or operation of the Federal Act.88
For local legislation to avoid pre-emption when a court is basing
such a ruling on Congress' express tolerance of local action, the local
legislature must not lessen or contravene either the purpose of oper-
ation of the federal legislation." The Florida law merely served to
increase the potential liability of the oil companies.88 It did not
lessen or alter the companies' liability to the federal government s.8
The supremacy clause notwithstanding, federal and local legisla-
tion may coexist within a given field based on a variety of criteria.
The express mandate of power in Huron was used to direct a strong
penalty at a single polluting instrument of commerce already under
the aegis of federal control. A similar mandate in American Water-
ways Operators was the basis for the imposition of a penalty no
stronger, but of greater scope, than its federal counterpart. Neither
a plan is to include "assignment of duties and responsibilities among Federal departments
and agencies in coordination with State and local agencies. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1)(A)
(1976).
82. 411 U.S. at 334-35. See id. at 333 n.5.
83. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act now extends liability to include, but
is not limited to "fish, shellfish, and wildlife and the public and private shorelines and
beaches of the United States. ... 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d) (1976). The Water Quality Improve-
ment Act of 1970 applied in this scope only in cases of "willful negligence or willful miscon-
duct." 33 U.S.C. § 1161(f)-(g) (1970). See 411 U.S. at 336.
84. Id. at 328-29.
85. Id. at 334-35.
86. Id. at 336. The Court postponed the question of whether the liability might result in
an excessive financial burden until an actual controversy presented itself. Id. The require-
ment of an actual controversy and reluctance to give advisory opinions might be questioned
giving the irreversible nature of the damage and the public interest involved.
87. See note 19 supra.
88. American Ass'n of St., Elect. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971).
89. 411 U.S. at 336. "Moreover, since Congress dealt only with 'cleanup' costs, it left the
States free to impose 'liability' in damages for losses suffered both by the States and by
private interests." Id.
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strength nor scope alone justifies a finding of pre-emption where
Congress has expressly indicated its tolerance of local legislation.
3. Limits on Penalties Implicit in "Minimum Standard"
Legislation
To effect an environmental change, Congress may enact a law
specifying a minimum standard to be met by a certain date. A
genuine conflict is occasioned when a locality enacts a standard
higher than the federally specified minimum. Congress' creation of
a timetable of minimum standards of clean air with which states
must comply was examined in Union Electric Co. v. Environment
Protection Agency." The states possessed the power to enact higher
standards of their own, even if attainment of those standards was
technologically and financially impossible." The federal Clean Air
Act Amendments 2 were passed to force the states to act more
quickly in eradicating air pollution by establishing a minimum
health-related standard to be met within three years and a more
stringent public welfare-related standard to be met within a reason-
able time. 3 The Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency used eight criteria" to initially approve the state legisla-
tion. 1 Neither technological nor financial impossibility was among
the criteria."
90. 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
91. Id. at 268-69. A potential due process challenge is beyond the scope of this Comment.
See id. at 269 n.19.
92. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1976). See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-
50.5 (1975). Due to litigation in this area, "it has taken longer to establish the meaning of its
programs than the time allotted for their accomplishment." Kramer, Economics, Technology,
and the Clean Air Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 EcOLoG Y L.Q. 161,163 (1976).
93. 427 U.S. at 249. "Suffice it to say that the Amendments reflect congressional dissatis-
faction with the progress of existing air pollution programs and a determination to 'tak[e] a
stick to the States. Id., citing Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S.
60, 64 (1975).
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, § 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1976). The
state legislation had to (A) conform to the federal minimum standards, (B) include schedules
and timetables, (C) provide data if requested by the Administrator of the EPA and include
procedures for compiling and measuring such information, (D) include reviewing procedures
concerning new regions to which the minimum standards would apply, (E) insure intergov-
ernmental cooperation, (F) include funding provisions, (G) provide for enforcement of the
standards applied to motor vehicles, (H) provide for revision of the entire system if necessary
to continue meeting minimum federal standards. Id.
95. Union Electric never sought review of the state plan in the appropriate time period.
427 U.S. at 252.
96. See note 124 supra. See also Kramer, Economics, Technology, and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970: The First Six Years, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 161 (1976).
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When variances, granted for two years, were not renewed, Union
Electric was notified that its emissions were in violation of state
law. 7 Union Electric contended that the local law was invalid be-
cause compliance was technologically and financially impossible."
Union Electric also argued that although Congress had intended the
creation of technology-forcing jegislation" (a purpose peculiar to
environmental law'00), the state was pre-empted from adopting the
federal purpose. This would not affect the state's right to enforce the
minimum federal standards. 0' Major conflict arose over the enact-
ment by Missouri of the more stringent public welfare-related emis-
sion standard as the three-year goal. 02 Congress had only recom-
mended that this standard be enacted within a reasonable time.'
3
It was alleged that Missouri could not engage in technology-forcing
by enacting the higher standard.
At issue was the broader principle of whether a state could, given
an express Congressional mandate to act in the field, adopt the
spirit of the law. "Minimum standard" does not, by nature, imply
an upper limit. The standard, therefore, carries the potential threat
of allowing a state to set unrealistic standards to further its own
ends.' 4 Congress' express mandate necessarily gave the states the
97. 427 U.S. at 252.
98. Id. at 253. But see People v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489
(1939). The New York Court of Appeals reversed a conviction of the shipping line for discharg-
ing "dense smoke" into the air over New York harbor. One of the grounds upon which the
conviction was reversed was the contention that technology at that time could not eliminate
the smoke.
"If the prohibition against the discharge of dense smoke is so applied that a steamship
company may be found guilty of a violation because, in the operation of great liners
with up-to-date equipment, dense smoke is discharged for a few minutes while a vessel
is being prepared for departure, though it is shown that, even in the exercise of the
greatest care, it would be impossible or impractical to avoid such smoke, then it seems
to me clear beyond question that the ordinance is unreasonable ....
Id. at 419, 21 N.E.2d at 490.
99. 427 U.S. at 256-57.
100. See note 93 supra.
101. 427 U.S. at 262.
102. Id. at 252 n.2.
103. Id. at 250 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1657c-5(a)(2)(A)).
104. Conceivably, these ends might not always be the elimination of air pollution. A
heavily industrialized area might have to enact such stringent measures to reach a minimum
standard of air cleanliness that industries might be forced to relocate to less polluted areas
where attainment of minimum standards would require less technological investment. The
corresponding loss of jobs belonging to state citizens provides an adequate incentive to the
state to give industry annual "variances." A state plan might set minimum emission stan-
dards so high as to make attainment practically impossible. Because Congress has not recog-
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power to deal with the problem to whatever extent they desired., 5
"So long as the national standards were met, the State may choose
whatever mix of control devices it desires. ... "' The Court has
interpreted "minimum standard" to create only a bottom line for
state action. 07 Such a standard implies no upper limit on compli-
ance and attainment of environmental goals by the state unless
expressly set by Congress.
4. Determining the Upper Limit on Power Given to Local Govern-
ment by Congress
Whether or not a local regulation will be upheld is often measured
by the difference between the power granted the states and the
extent to which states utilize that power. Conflict is not resolved by
holding that certain local legislation is not pre-empted. The amount
of power delegated and whether the action has exceeded this limit
must be determined.
Power to enact airport curfews was impliedly denied local govern-
ment in Lockheed. 108 Thus, the finding of pre-emption obviated the
need for the Court to establish the quantity of power given Bur-
bank. 019 Power expressly given to the local government by Congress
nized technological or financial impossibility as a ground for invalidation of the state law,
see note 94 supra, a court would have to uphold the variances. A state, to circumvent the
federal minimum standards, could enact excessively high standards and then issue variances
ad infinitum. The state, ostensibly acting to eliminate air pollution by enacting higher stan-
dards, would, in reality, be acting in collusion with industry.
105. - 427 U.S. at 259-60. The Court concluded that Congress desired to remedy "what was
perceived as a serious and otherwise uncheckable problem of air pollution," by giving pollu-
tion control strategies" to the states.
The Committee determined that 1) the health of people is more important than the
question of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards protective
of health is technically feasible . . . . Therefore, the Committee determined that
existing sources of pollutants either should meet the standard of the law or be closed
down . . . .
Id. at 259, quoting S. Rep. No. 91-1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
106. Id. at 266 (citing Train v. National Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79
(1975)).
107. The Court recognizes that this path is not without risk. Id. at 269. See Sherrod,
Introductory Survey-1973, 4 ENvIR. L. Ray. xi-xii (1973) (discussion of implementation
plans).
108. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
109. "A finding of pre-emption tends to be a perfunctory constitutional decision. It is
analogous to the Court's practice of deciding a case on other than constitutional grounds if
at all possible." Warren, Airport Noise Regulation, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 403, 409 (1976)(footnote
omitted). The "perfunctory" nature of pre-emption might be more soundly anologized to
disposing of a controversy on jurisdictional non-constitutional grounds (i.e. lack of standing)
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to deal with the problem of air pollution allowed the Detroit ordi-
nance to escape pre-emption despite its use of criminal sanctions."10
In the future, a general grant of power to achieve a given result will
lead the courts to accept whatever penalty the locality has deemed
appropriate based on the nature of the pollution.
The Florida law in American Waterways Operators, although
enacted by express Congressional mandate, exceeded the scope of
the federal statute."' Under the express grant of power, the state
was not substantially limited in its efforts to impose broader bases
of liability. Thus, it is important to note whether, an express upper
limit exists on the power exerted by the states.
Union Electric destroyed the concept that a "minimum stan-
dard" might be considered an immutable edict to be followed by the
states. Huron, American Waterways Operators, and Union Electric
illustrate that once Congress has expressly given power to local gov-
ernment, whether or not in the form of minimum standard legisla-
tion, a locality may achieve federally imposed goals without fear of
pre-emption.
D. Conflict Pre-emption
1. Judicially Imposed Distinctions to Avoid Pre-emption
Once a local law has been held pre-empted, whether courts gener-
ally favor voiding the local law in its entirety or severing those
portions that might aboid pre-emption is significant. In Ray v. At-
lantic Richfield Co.,"' a Washington law 3 prescribing strict design
standards and pilotage requirements was partially pre-empted by
federal legislation. The general purpose of the Washington law was
to minimize the danger of oil spills in Puget Sound. The Court
considered each of the three sections of the law separately."4
The first provision involved the application of a judicial distinc-
tion to overcome or resolve the pre-emption challenge. This section
were it not for the impact of a finding of pre-emption on the ability of local government to
act in a given field. A holding of pre-emption effectively denies local government the power
to legislate for the life of the federal law.
110. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Justice Douglas
dissenting, questioned whther the severity of the problem warranted a criminal penalty in
light offederal licensing. Id. at 449.50 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
111. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1973).
112. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
113. WASH. REv. CODE §§ 88.16.170-88.16.190 (Supp. 1975).
114. 435 U.S. at 158.
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of the Washington law required all tankers to have on board a state-
licensed pilot."' The Court contrasted the purpose of the Washing-
ton law with that of the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972
(PWSA)."6 Congress intended to pre-empt local legislation only as
to enrolled vessels;"17 as applied to registered vessels,"18 the Washing-
ton regulation was permitted to stand."' Under Title I of the PWSA,
the Secretary of Transportation was authorized to regulate enrolled
vessel traffic throughout the country.'20 Congressional silence con-
cerning registered vessels left Washington free to enact legislation
in this area.'2 '
The distinction between registered and enrolled vessels was not
contemplated by the Washington legislature. Although the legisla-
ture had not expressly made provision for such division, the Court
will sever the portions which actually conflict while allowing the
remainder to stand.
2. Pre-emption by Similarity of Purpose
Comprehensive federal legislation and the excessive strength of
the local penalty are not the sole grounds upon which a finding of
pre-emption may be based. Frustration of a federal goal will serve
to pre-empt the local ordinance.
A second provision of the Washington law in Atlantic Richfield
set forth vessel design requirements and demanded such features as
twin propellers, double hulls beneath storage tanks, and special
collision avoidance radar.'22 This portion of the law came into direct
conflict with Title II of the PWSA,'23 which has as its stated purpose
"the protection of life, property, and the marine environment from
harm."'"' Pre-emption exists if the purpose of the local statute over-
115. Id., see WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.180 (Supp. 1975).
116. Id. The Washington law specifically conflicted with 46 U.S.C. § 215 (1976), 46 U.S.C.
§ 364 (1976), and 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (Supp. V 1970)(safety program).
117. "Enrolled vessels are those 'engaged in domestic or coastwise trade or used for fish-
ing' whereas registered vessels are those engaged in trade with foreign countries." 435 U.S.
151, 158 n.7 (1978), quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 272-73 (1977).
118. See note 117 supra.
119. 435 U.S. at 160.
120. 46 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), 33 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976). See 33 C.F.R. § 164 (1977). See also
text accompanying note 130-140 infra.
121. 435 U.S. at 159-60.
122. WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1975). See 435 U.S. at 160.
123. Id. at 161. See 46 U.S.C. § 391a (1970 ed. Supp. V).
124. 435 U.S. at 161. See 46 U.S.C. § 391a(1) (Supp. V 1970). The policy of Congress is
to eliminate the hazards to life, property and the resources within the navigable waters of
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laps and conflicts with that of the federal legislation.2 1
Pre-emption was based on "congressional intention to establish a
uniform federal regime."'25 The crucial issue was that "[t]he fed-
eral scheme thus aims precisely at the same ends as does §
88.16190(2) of the Washington Law."' 27 The PWSA was enacted
with an awareness of the problem of oil spills."2s Though not specifi-
cally formulated to eliminate the danger of oil spills to the extent
.desired by Washington, the federal design requirements were clearly
enacted with that goal in mind. "Congress did not anticipate that
a vessel found to be in compliance with the Secretary's design and
construction requirements would . . . nevertheless be barred from
operating in the navigable waters of the United States on the ground
that its design characteristics constitute an undue hazard."'2
3. Pre-emption by Assignment to a Federal Agency
Three situations may arise once a federal agency has an environ-
mental problem placed in its care.3 0 The agency may postpone deci-
sion pending investigation, act, or consider the problem and decide
no action is warranted. Failure of a federal agency to consider a
problem within its field of responsibility creates an implied grant
of power to local government to act which terminates immediately
upon the action of the federal agency. Therefore, delegation to a
federal agency of a Congressional duty to act represents the final
gound for pre-emption.
Atlantic Richfield did not hold that the tanker design require-
ments discussed above were to be disregarded merely because they
were pre-empted as to their original purpose of modifying ship de-
sign. '3 Any enrolled or registered vessels failing to meet the design
the United States caused by the carriage of certain cargoes in bulk. Id.
125. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See Ray v. Alantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 158 (1978).
126. 435 U.S. at 165.
127. Id.
128. "To implement the twin goals of providing for vessel safety and protecting the marine
environment, it is provided that the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard
is located 'shall establish' such rules and regulations as may be necessary . Id. at 161
(citing 46 U.S.C. § 391a(3) (Supp. V 1970)(footnote omitted).
129. 435 U.S. at 164. To establish pre-emption, no comprehensive scheme of federal
legislation was necessary; frustration of a federal goal was sufficient. Id. at 158.
130. See text accompanying note 120 supra.
131. Id. at 173. Although the design standards could not be implemented, they could be
utilized as the determinant of whether the vessel would fall under another valid state regula-
tion.
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requirements imposed by the Washington law were allowed to enter
Puget Sound without structural modification, but would have to
utilize a tug escort while entering or leaving the harbor.' Although
under Title I of the PWSA, the Secretary of Transportation could
enact or forego a tug escort requirement, pre-emption could not be
found until such time as he considered the problem .133
The final regulation imposed by the Washington law was a com-
plete ban on all tankers over 125,000 deadweight tons (DWT) from
entering Puget Sound under any conditions. '3 It is peculiarly within
the purview of the Secretary of Transportion to act in this field.'35
This portion of the Washington law could have survived if the Secre-
tary had failed to act within this area. 136
Once a federal agency has been delegated the responsibility to act
in a given area by Congress, intentional failure of the federal agency
to act after consideration of the problem constitutes pre-emption of
the local regulation. The Secretary's limitation of only one vessel of
70,000 DWT to Rosario Straits in Puget Sound at one time (40,000
DWT in inclement weather) proved that the Secretary had consid-
ered the problem and taken action.3 7 The Secretary's decision here
does not have the same effect as that of the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency regarding Congress' minimum
emission standards in Union Electric. The Atlantic Richfield deci-
sion makes clear that a safety regulation is not equivalent to a
minimum standard upon which a state may add requirements.' 38
132. Id.
133. Id. at 172. The mere presence of the topic on the agenda of the Secretary of the
applicable federal agency is not sufficient consideration of the problem by the federal agency
to constitute pre-emption. There must be a decisive statement by the' Secretary. Id. at 172
n.23.
134. WASH. REv. CODE § 88.16.190(1) (Supp. 1975).
135. 435 U.S. at 171. See 33 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(iii) (1976).
136. 435 U.S. at 174. The State was allowed to enact safety standards higher than those
of the federal government only as applied to "structures." 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(1976). Thus
the pertinent inquiries were whether a vessel was a structure, and if not, what limit, if any,
had the Secretary imposed on tanker size to effectively create the federal standard.
137. Id. at 174-75.
138. However, states may so act if that is the intent of Congress, expressed or implied.
See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973). But see Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960). Vessels approved and
licensed under federal law were subject to local legislation (under express Congressional
mandate) which sought an abatement of air pollution. There was an absolute distinction
between the purposes and operation of the local and federal legislation. Despite the express
mandate, actual conflict is the final test for federal preemption. 435 U.S. at 158. In Huron,
the local legislation was aimed at a reduction of air pollution from ships; the federal law
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The 125,000 DWT tanker ban was pre-empted by the Secretary's
action though insufficient in the view of the Washington legislature.
The Court in Atlantic Richfield has recognizedthis dilemma and
displays sensitivity to the environmental desires of local governing
bodies and their constituents. Problems that have a bearing on a
larger, nationwide activity often pose an immediate threat to the
health and well-being of a community. Despite its decision concern-
ing pre-emption, the Court reaffirmed the states' right to expect and
demand individual atttention from the federal government. 40
. Pre-emption of local law does not confer an absolute right upon
Congress to enact a single regulation applicable to the entire na-
tion.' Similar to the problem in Lockheed relating to the Burbank
airport curfew,' Atlantic Richfield recognized the need for a single
agency to create local regulations favorable to both local and na-
tional interests.' Neither Congress nor a federal agency empowered
by it may shirk its responsibility to local needs by creating a single
rule applicable to the entire country.' In most environmental con-
texts, a need for uniform regulation is more aptly defined as a need
for a lone regulator.
issued licenses concerning a ship's suitability based on its safety, not on its emission. Licens-
ing under both the Ports and Waterways Safety Act and under the Washington law in
Atlantic Richfield was aimed at the protection of the marine environment from harm.
139. Id. at 178. Bans based on size are not pre-empted per se. The Fire Commissioner of
New York City has banned any tank truck carrying over 3000 gallons of gasoline from making
a delivery within the city limits. New York City Fire Prevention Directive III, § 4-1 (March
10, 1978). Larger tank trucks en route to outlying areas reachable only through the city (i.e.,
Nassau and Suffolk Counties) are restricted to certain routes. The ban works a definite
hardship on city drivers who must pay increased prices for gasoline. Nevertheless, the poten-
tial danger of a larger tank truck accident in a populous area clearly balances out the extra
cost to consumers.
The power to enact the directive is located in part III of the Interstate Commerce Act of
1887, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970). The States are expressly allowed to enact regulations
provided they comport with various filing requirements of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
son. 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) (1970). Similarly, "[alny State or political subdivision may apply
to the OHMO (Office of Hazardous Materials Operation) for a determination that a particu-
lar existing requirement of that State or political subdivision which is inconsistent with the
Act or the regulations issued under the Act is not preempted." 49 C.F.R. § 107.215(a) (1977).
140. 435 U.S. at 177. However, Lockheed noted the possibility of preemption despite the
lack of a remedy to the environmental problem. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 411 U.S. at 638.
141. Id. The Secretary is to "consider fully the wide variety of interests which may be
affected by the exercise of his authority hereunder." 33 U.S.C. § 1222(e)(1976).
142. See text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
143. 435 U.S. at 177.
144. id.
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E. Pre-emption: Future Problems
Rapidly changing technology presents courts with an almost im-
possible task: determining whether a local law is pre-empted under
conditions that could not have been foreseen upon passage of federal
legislation."' This difficulty is alleviated somewhat by regular pro-
mulgation of Congressional guidelines."'
Effective environmental legislation must be achieved through
mutual cooperation between federal and local government. On April
13, 1978, the Environment Protection Agency granted to California
a waiver of federal pre-emption in order to allow California to en-
force its own emission standards. "' The waiver was conditioned
upon California's protection of its citizens' health and welfare"' and
could be revoked if the standards imposed by California were arbi-
145. In California v. Department of Navy, 9 ERC 2077 (N. D. Cal. 1977), the District
Court held that the federal Clean Air Act did not pre-empt the application of state emission
regulations on Navy test cells. Under the Act, the state was allowed to regulate smoke
emissions from stationary sources. The federal government was given exclusive power to
regulate aircraft emissions. Navy test cells are immense concrete structures in which aircraft
engines, separate from their bodies, are tested and repaired. These cells presented a genuine
question of interpretation to the court who finally concluded that the test cells were a land
structure and not under federal jurisdiction. The most current bulletins are insufficient to
advise a court of true Congressional intent as new dangers and substances are discovered. For
example, on February 7, 1979 The New York Times reported that residents of the Love Canal
area of New York had experienced health improvements after being evacuated from their
homes. The residents all lived near the Love Canal in which toxic wastes were dumped. The
materials then allegedly filtered through the soil and into the homes of the victims. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 7, 1979, §B, at 2, col. 1. As the effects of pollution become more pervasive it is
clear that discerning the effects, for example whether Congress intended the power to regulate
the newly-discovered form of pollution to be solely theirs, is an almost impossible task.
146. 49 C.F.R. § 172.101 (1977) lists and classifies over a thousand hazardous materials
for transportation. With even more specifity, the various radionuclides of 91 elements are
listed and classified. 49 C.F.R. § 173.390 (1977). Despite the detail of these regulations, a
small change in chemical compound may allow a manufacturer to avoid the strict federal
regulations. This has exceptional impact in the practice of dumping wastes, where a harmful
effect may not be noticed for years. Following the ban a similar, equally harmful, but legally
different material may be used and dumped before federal regulations "catch up" with the
new substance.
147. 8 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1999 (April 13, 1978). See Exxon Corp. v. City of New York, 9
ERC 1670 (2d Cir. 1977), in which a New York City regulation to lower the lead content of
gasoline was expressly pre-empted within the language of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1857f-6c(c)(4)(A) (1976). The court rejected the argument that express pre-emption must be
narrowly construed if local regulations seek the same goals as the federal law. It is noteworthy
that the court accorded great weight to 42 U.S.C. § 1867d-1 which stated that Congress had
no desire to pre-empt any air pollution abatement regulation save those expressly pre-
empted.
148. 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) at 1999.
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trary and capricious or unnecessary.'49 The Environment Protection
Agency also demanded that California give consideration to the
time and cost of implementation as well as the technological feasi-
bility of compliance.9 0
Given intelligible guidelines, local law can coexist harmoniously
with Federal legislation. Overly specific language of pre-emption,
however, may be interpreted as impliedly permitting local govern-
ments to act without restraint in all other areas. Hence, detailed
pre-emption clauses are not favored as viable alternatives to present
problems of construction. Expansion of this type of federal expres-
sion will result in an increase of overreaching and litigation by local
government.
Conversely, Congressional language generally pre-empting an
entire field may not be the true indicator of Congressional intent.
Congress may make subsequent exceptions to the pre-emption
clause and specifically sanction appeasement of local interests.
Such a trial-and-error approach should not be used in federal legis-
lation. One issue is whether Congress should barter away legitimate
local interests in return for simplified statutory construction in
cases where there is no pressing need for uniform regulation or po-
tential relaxation of a safety standard. A second pitfall of this ap-
proach is the inability of Congress to fulfill the responsibility im-
plicit in such a blanket prohibition. Once the functions of the legis-
lation are delegated to a federal agency, if the agency is unable to
consider all the issues, the area might be subject to local regulation
until the federal agency makes a decision.' 5'
Another pressing issue concerns the quantity of power given local
government. Minimum standards imposed upon the states now
carry restrictive language."52 It is unlikely that the situation in
Union Electric will ever be repeated. Some local areas, however, still
face problems with uniform standards. One region may be forced to
expend larger sums of money than another in attempting to comply
with the minimum guidelines. Heavily polluted areas will incur the
149. Id.
150. Id. The practical effect of this waiver may be distinguished from the minimum
standard situation in Union Electric. See text accompanying notes 90-107 supra. This waiver
imposes minimum standards, but also provides federal compliance guidelines, making the
wiaver terminable at will.
151. 435 U.S. at 172 n.23. See note 133 supra. See also text accompanying notes 130-140
supra.
152. See, e.g., 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1999 (April 13, 1978).
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bulk of initial research and development costs while cleaner areas
may benefit from these pre-paid advances in technology as higher
minimum standards are enacted. Another drawback of restrictions
on minimum standards is that they preclude a state from voluntar-
ily enacting more stringent standards. This is a serious disability in
light of the Congressional goal to eliminate pollution and the consid-
eration that many areas, able to meet initial standards with no
action at all, should not be foreclosed from contributing to the Fed-
eral goal.
Pre-emption ought not to be regarded as a hindrance to environ-
mental reform. Clearly, local governments fear a relinquishment of
power over their environmental future. This is predicated on the
perceived inability of Congress and its instrumentalities to act
quickly and effectively. 5 ' Congress shall embrace local needs as
enthusiastically as it first attacked the pollution problem. 5" This
could transform the negative connotation of pre-emption from an
odious abandonment of local control to the gratified bestoway of a
sensitive issue upon a responsible and impartial arbiter.
IV. The Commerce Clause
A. General Considerations
Local legislation which avoids federal pre-emption must not ex-
ceed other limitations set by the Constitution on state and local
power. One obstacle frequently encountered is the commerce
clause. 5' Principles applicable to the cases in the field of environ-
mental law oiginated in controversies over state regulations affect-
ing safety standards,'56 protecting health, 57 or attempting to keep
some form of commerce within'58 or without the state.'59 Conflicts
between state environmental legislation and the commerce clause
153. See notes,63-64 supra.
154. See note 18 supra.
155. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See note 1 supra. The commerce clause serves a dual
function. As a positive grant of power, this constitutional provision allows Congress to
"regulate" interstate commerce. The commerce clause also serves as a limit on the states'
right to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce. B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTrrTUnONAL LAw
126 (1979). This Comment is limited to anlaysis of environmental law under the latter cate-
gory.
156. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
157. See, e.g., Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908).
158. See, e.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Foster-Fountain Packing Co.
v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
159. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941).
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have made it extremely difficult to apply principles and tests formu-
lated in the past.
The divisive and protectionist 60 power over commerce exerted by
the individual states prior to the Constitutional Convention
prompted the adoption of the commerce clause."6 ' The original func-
tion of the commerce clause was to place interstate commerce under
the control of a single, non-biased entity and erase all obstacles that
might'stand in the way of a flourishing system.'
State and local regulations affecting interstate commerce must
withstand a number of tests in order to be considered non-violative
of the commerce clause. The law must not enter an area demanding
a uniform rule, nor may it discriminate against interstate com-
merce. If both these criteria are met, the benefits afforded local
residents are weighed against the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce by the regulation. 63 The following sections will examine
each of these tests and alternative interpretations in the context of
environmental benefits.
B. The Need for Uniform Regulation
A local regulation affecting a form of interstate commerce which
inherently requires a uniform rule will be automatically invalidated.
Pre-emption under the commerce clause was first examined in
Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens. 64 In declaring a Pennsylvania
pilotage requirement non-violative of the commerce clause, the
Court set the standard that the need for uniform regulation would
be sufficient to pre-empt state and local legislation within a given
area. 6 5 The added cost to shipowners was permissible in Cooley due
to the necessity of the regulation and the superflousness and impos-
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 7 (A. Hamilton). See E. BuRNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
633-34 (1964).
161. "The poor condition of American commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries
between the states were the immediate provocations for the calling of the Constitutional
Convention." G.GUNTHERS CONSTrrTUnONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 127 (9th ed. 1975). But
see M. JENSEN, THE NEW NATION 245-52 (1952)(proposing several alternate theories for the
foundation of the Constitution).
162. See THi FEDERALIST No. 23 (A. Hamilton). See also letter of George Washington to
John Jay, August 1, 1786, reprinted in XXVIII J. FrrzPATRICK, ed., THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 216-7 (1938).
163. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
164. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1852).
165. Id. at 313-14.
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sibility of enacting a uniform rule throughout the nation.' This test
has since remained the prerequisite for all others concerning local
and state regulation of interstate commerce.
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co."7 held federal law pre-empted state
design requirements"8 intended to eliminate the risk of potential oil
spills from Puget Sound. Such design requirements, however, could
be used to determine tug escort requirements without violation of
the commerce clause.' "Similar in nature to a pilotage require-
ment, a requirement that a vessel take on a tug escort when entering
a particular body of water is not the type of regulation that demands
a uniform rule."'' 70
A state regulation can coexist with the commerce clause when it
does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.'7' To evaluate
the validity of a state law, a series of further tests have been formu-
lated by the Supreme Court.
The immense growth of federal legislation dealing with environ-
mental goals has led to a confusion of the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause. 7 1 Where Congress has acted in an area demand-
ing uniform regulation, court have seen this need for uniform rule
as a basis for pre-emption under the supremacy clause.'73 The need
for uniform regulation under the commerce clause does not require
federal legislation to be operative, but does require a positive show-
ing of all the definitional components of the commerce clause.7 4
166. Id. "But when the nature of a power like this is spoken of, when it is said that the
nature of the power requires that it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be
intended to refer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress." Id. at 318. There is, in this doctrine, no require-
ment that Congress be presently fashioning legislation, merely that there be a need for it.
167. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
168. See text accompanying notes 112-29 supra.
169. 435 U.S. at 179-80.
170. Id. at 179.
171. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
172. Compare Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 318-19 (1852) (need
for uniform regulation invalidates state law under the commerce clause) with City of Burbank
v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)(need for uniform regulation assisted in
presumption that Congress intended to pre-empt the field of airspace management under the
supremacy clause).
173. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). See text accom-
panying notes 48-64 supra.
174. An example of the application of definitional criteria is presented in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). The first issue considered by the Court was whether
traffic in garbage constituted commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause. The
Court examined the state court's interpretation of prior United States Supreme Court deci-
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Under the supremacy clause, Congress may remove an area from
consideration by state and local legislatures merely through the
inclusion of an express pre-emption clause. This generally precludes
any discussion of the need for uniform regulation.'7 5
C. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce
A state, in protecting an interest of its citizenry under the police
power,'76 can affect'77 or regulate' 8 interstate commerce, provided it
is non-discriminatory. A state cannot, for example, lock within its
borders its precious stores of natural gas, and oil and deny their
availability to other states.'79 In Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural
Gas, 1, 0 all the natural gas fields beneath the surface were connected
and it was admitted that the productivity of one well lessened the
future productivity of the gas field as a whole.'' The state regulation
prohibited the transportation of natural gas and oil to consumers
outside the state while imposing no burden on the in-state con-
sumer.'82 Oklahoma's interest in preserving its oil and natural gas
supply was deemed insufficient to overcome the discrimination
against Oklahoma's neighboring states.' 3
The statute blatantly violated the non-discriminatory goal of the
sions and concluded that the state court erred in holding that waste products were not a
legitimate subject of commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause. "All objects of
interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the
outset." Id. at 622. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), the Court allowed
a similar pre-emption of state regulation under the commerce clause. Neel, Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield: A Case for Preemption, 5 Hastings L.Q. at 570. The Court acknowledged both the
similarity and the confusion of these tests. 325 U.S. at 768-69.
175. Local regulation in areas demanding uniform regulation is often pre-empted.
"Where the characteristics of a field call for exclusive national jurisdiction, Congress
is more likely to be concerned that concurrent state authority would interfere with
achievement of federal goals. Moreover, federal preemption of state authority would
meet with less opposition if the states' interest in regulating that activity was less
substantial. Thus, it is more likely that Congress may have reserved to itself a field
the characteristics of which traditionally make it one for exclusive national jurisdic-
tion."
Tribe, California Declines the Nuclear Gamble: Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 Ecol-
ogy L.Q. 679, 690-91 (1979)(footnote omitted).
176. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See notes 7 & 155 supra.
177. Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
178. Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1852).
179. West v. Kansas Natural Gas, Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 245-46.
182. 1907 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 67, quoted in 221 U.S. at 239 n.1.
183. 221 U.S. at 262.
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commerce clause. Oklahoma contended that conservation and not
discrimination was the purpose of regulation."' The analogy of oil
and natural gas to wild animals and natural resources in desperate
need of conservation was rejected by the Court."5 Natural gas and
oil are commodities. If the law were allowed to stand, the ramifica-
tions might be endless:'86 "Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the
Northwest its timber, the mining states their minerals."'' 7 So-called
conservation measures might initiate a series of embargoes among
states defeating the primary purpose of the commerce clause. The
effect of the commerce clause was to place the needs of the country
as a whole above those of each state. "[Tihe welfare . . .of each
state is made the greater 'by a division of its resources, natural and
created, with every other state, and those of every other state with
it. 18
A New Jersey act'89 prohibiting the importation of most waste
material into the state was examined in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey.' Because it was discriminatory in nature,' the act was
declared unconstitutional. A certain amount of conflict with inter-
state commerce is permissible to protect state interests under the
police power. The Court in City of Philadelphia reiterated its guide-
lines for invalidating a state law based on discrimination against
interstate commerce and stated "incidental burdens on interstate
184. Id. at 250-01.
185. Id. at 258-59. Oklahoma attempted to convince the Court that oil and gas were ferae
naturae. This defense was applied to game animals in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896). The states' peculiar interest in the preservation of game was traced to classical times
by the Court. The Court concluded the State's role was that of protector of the ferae naturae
for the communal benefit of the state's citizens, rather than that of proprietor. Id. at 529.
While there was some authority for the extension of this doctrine to water, air and shoreline,
id. at 525., Kansas Natural Gas refused to extend the doctrine to such obviously saleable
commodities as oil and natural gas.
186. 221 U.S. at 255.
187. Id. The sharing of resources was considered of paramount importance to the general
welfare of the nation; however, it is clear the Court did not anticipate a situation in which
the resource was incapable of sale outside the state, yet had the characteristics of a commod-
ity. The distinction was branded meaningless in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
at 628. Thus, the state is powerless to erect barriers to keep resources within the state, or to
keep harmful agents from depleting a state's non-removable resources.
188. 221 U.S. at 255. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)(free shipment
of uncrated cantaloupes mandated). But see Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (Florida
was allowed to prohibit the export of unripe oranges to protect its commercial reputation).
189. N.Y. Rev. STAT. § 13:11-10.
190. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
191. Id. at 626-27.
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commerce may be unavoidable when a state acts to safeguard the
health and safety of its people.""' .However, "where simple eco-
nomic protectionism is effected by state legislation a virtually per
se rule of invalidity has been erected."" 3
Discrimination against interstate commerce will be found where
a staie attempts to protect its economy by burdening the transac-
tion of interstate business based on a fabricated environmental ben-
efit to the community."' No health hazards arising out of the actual
transportation of the waste products were found to exist in City of
Philadelphia. 5 All danger to New Jersey citizens occurred once the
waste reached the New Jersey landfill sites, and, at that point, the
New Jersey waste could not be distinguished from that of Pennsyl-
vania or New York."' If there were some inherent hazard in the
transportation of garbage, the New Jersey statute would be analo-
gous to a quarantine regulation"7 and might have been regarded
more favorably by the Court."'
A state may not keep scarce natural resources out of interstate
commerce solely to satisfy the projected needs of the state's citi-
zens.1' City of Philadelphia expands that rule, holding "a state may
not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over con-
sumers in other states to natural resources located within its bor-
192. Id. at 623-24.
193. Id. at 624.
194. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336
U.S. 525 (1949). In both cases local and state regulations were invalidated as protective of
intrastate at the expense of interstate commerce, although both laws were ostensibly health
measures. Although the police power contemplates the protection of economic interests, the
commerce clause will not abide a discriminatory burden on interstate commerce on economic
interests. To enact a discriminatory regulation, a state must have an immediate and vital
health interests as its goal, not mere economic favoritism.
195. 437 U.S. at 629.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 628-29. See Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137 (1902).
198. It is important to bear in mind that the health of the community must be in immedi-
ate danger. A potential hazard, or one of low risk but great danger, will not suffice. In New
York v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 9 ERC 1825 (2d Cir. 1977), the court affirmed an
order of the District Court denying New York an injunction banning all flights over New York
City carrying radioactive materials of a certain concentration. The court examined in detail
the probability of a commercial airline crash carrying nuclear materials. The conclusion that
commercial air travel is one of the safest modes of travel outweighed the potential death toll
and havoc that would be caused by the crash of a single airplane carrying radioactive materi-
als within the city limits.
199. West v. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
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ders."200 Fossil fuels were both the article of commerce and the
state's scarce resource in Kansas Natural Gas. The article of com-
merce in City of Philadelphia was garbage while the scarce resource
was landfill. New Jersey was given no more right to protect private
land located within its borders than was Oklahoma to protect a
resource capable of removal for use outside the state.20" ' The crucial
similarity was that the respective state governments chose to pro-
tect their resources with discriminatory legislation.
The Court placed upon New Jersey the burden of absorbing the
waste of sister states.2 2 Small comfort indeed are the assurances by
the Supreme Court that one day the commerce clause will protect
New Jersey in its attempts to dump in neighboring states."3 This
holding will inevitably result in additional cost to the citizens of
New Jersey by forcing them to seek alternative waste disposal sites
sooner than they might otherwise have to develop them.0 4 The effect
of this decision is to merely to forestall the day that alternative
waste disposal methods will have to be created.
D. Balancing Test
After application of the tests for discrimination and need for uni-
form regulation, a balancing test is employed to determine whether
the putative benefit to the state outweighs the burden placed on
200. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 627.
201. Id. This statement would seem to contradict the Court's recent holding in Baldwin
v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), in which hunting license fees
imposed upon non-residents were over seven times those charged residents. The Court failed
to find violations of the privileges and immunities clause, or the equal protection clause since
the right to hunt Montana elk could not be considered fundamental, nor could this system
of protecting a state resource capable of exhaustion be considered irrational. On the contrary,
it was a logical and efficacious method of dealing with a pressing problem. See Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
The difference between the cases above and the principal cases is the regulated resource.
In Baldwin and Gibbons, the land upon which the resource existed was owned by the state,
thus owned by every state resident. See note 185 supra. In City of Philadelphia, the landfill
areas existed on land owned by private developers. Thus, despite the fact that the New Jersey
landfill areas, although privately owned, are crucial to the well-being of the state, their
contents may not be regulated where the statute is discriminatory.
202. 437 U.S. at 629. To date, a state may only exclude quarantined substances, Mintz
v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933), and items of commerce intrinsically tied to fraud. Plumley
v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894). The commerce clause will not protect fraud. This
determination is usually effected as a definitional criterion. See note 174 supra.
203. 437 U.S. at 629.
204. Freilich, 1977-78 Annual Review of Local Government Law: Judicial and Constitu-
tional Intervention in Municipal Fiscal Affairs, 10 Urb. Law. 573, 613 (1978).
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interstate commerce. "If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved and on whether it could be promoted as well with
lesser impact on interstate activities. '" '05
In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,100 a Detroit
Smoke Abatement Code was held not to impose an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce, despite its substantial effect of forc-
ing ships engaged in interstate commerce to structurally modify
their engines. 07 The Court held the lack of either discrimination or
need for uniform regulation prerequisites, and the importance of the
expected benefit to the community outweighed any possible burden
on interstate commerce.
The tug escort in Atlantic Richfield Co. did not discriminate, nor
did it require uniform regulation by Congress. 0° The benefit was
then contrasted against the burden on interstate commerce. 09 The
205. 437 U.S. at 624 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
206. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). See discussion of preemption in Huron at text accompanying
notes 65-73 supra.
207. 362 U.S. at 448. But see People v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d
489 (1939). The mere imposition of a criminal penalty was deemed to be an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce. There was neither a need for a uniform rule, nor was the
ordinance discriminatory. In a balancing test, the benefit of clean air was given far less weight
forty years ago than now. In the field of environmental law, the importance of a changing
moral climate should not be underestimated. Given this consideration, the concept of forum-
shopping ascends to monumental significance as litigants view which courts are most likely
to be swayed by the various arguments being urged.
208. See text accompanying notes 112-40 supra.
209. 435 U.S. at 179-80. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). While
the balancing is certainly influenced by a court's personal bias, the decision need not be made
in a total vacuum. There are innumerable exhaustive studies carried out by various agencies,
industry, and environmental public interest research groups. For example, in July, 1977, the
Office of Minerals Policy and Research Analysis of the Department of the Interior published
a final report (prepared by Energy and Environmental Analysis, Inc.) entitled Benefit/Cost
Analysis of Laws and Regulations Affecting Coal. In its preface the report states:
"Recent years have seen the institution of numerous Federal, State and local laws,
regulations and standards designed to affect the supply and consumption of coal. ...
In the fact of these rapid changes, it is becoming increasingly difficult to know whether
the numerous new laws and regulations, by themselves or in concert with each other,
result in a net social benefit or cost to society."
Id.
The report investigates every possible aspect of coal production, from equipment, reclama-
tion and revegetation to fatal and non-fatal accident benefit valuation. In-depth analyses
such as this one, serve to legitimize the science of balancing environmental interests.
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Court estimated "the cost of a tug escort for a 120,000 DWT tanker
is less than one cent per barrel of oil." ' This slight burden was
outweighed by the benefits to the environment in the form of oil spill
prevention. The legitimate environmental concerns in Kansas Nat-
ural Gas and City of Philadelphia were utterly irrelevant because
the presence of discrimination obviated the need for the invocation
of the balancing test."'
E. Non-comparable Benefits in the Balancing Test
The balancing test is subject to numerous interpretations. One
path is to accord all environmental objectives the status of non-
comparability.2 12 Previously used to protect ferae naturae, 21 the con-
cept of non-comparability readily lends itself to environmental law.
When a benefit to a community is of such value that it cannot be
contrasted with the economic indicia of interstate commerce, it may
be properly defined a non-comparable objective.214
210. 435 U.S. at 180.
211. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 626. See C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONSr-
TUtrONAL INTERPReTATmON 146 (1978).
212. See text accompanying notes 229-30 infra.
213. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See also note 185 supra.
214. The following analysis is significant as early evidence of the recognition of the exist-
ence of non-comparable benefits in the field of environmental law.
"Our present high level of environmental concern grew from a recognition that
pollution was damaging man and nature. The damages occur when a pollutant is not
stopped at its source or successfully avoided after it has been released. Damage costs
include damage to health, to vegetation, and to materials; the costs of repairing such
damages, the destruction of ecosystems; and the loss of aesthetic, recreational, and
other environmental amenities.
Many damage costs represent a loss of tangible resources-the medical care required
to treat pollution-caused illness, for example, and the cost of cleaning clothes or paint-
ing houses more often. These are the costs most often estimated and reported as
pollution damage costs, and they are usually measured in terms of the marketplace
value of the resources destroyed or consumed.
In addition to these tangible costs, there are various intangible costs-the anxiety
created by congestion, risks to health and safety, the aesthetic blight of strip develop-
ment, the unpleasantness of foul odors and the annoyance of excessive noise. Often
called psychic costs, they embrace the range of annoyance and other psychological
costs associated with environmental degradation beyond the value of any physical
resources damaged. Often they are matters of preference, and their importance is not
usually measured accurately by the marketplace. The fact that these psychic costs do
not consume tangible resources does not make them less important. A human want
that does not directly consume a tangible resource is no less important than one that
does.
Many types of environmental damage will create both tangible and intangible costs.
By damaging health, air pollution aggects tangible resources by causing lost produc-
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Determining the intent of the local legislature, whether public
health and safety or economic protection, is often an impossible task
since almost all environmental legislation has economic repercus-
sions. Although the economic ramifications are not always the pri-
mary purpose, there are instances of economic or protectionist regu-
lation cloaked in environmental or public health interests."'
The court will determine whether the burden on interstate com-
merce exceeds the expected benefit of a certain public health mea-
sure. This may constitute a usurpation of legislative power. ' Pre-
sumably, the legislature has already weighed the benefit and burden
prior to enacting the legislation. " Neither Huron nor Atlantic Rich-
field Co. perceived the danger of applying a balancing of interest
test. In both cases, the protected resources (oil-free beaches and
smoke-free air) outweighed any burden on interstate commerce. 211
However, the invocation of the non comparable benefit test would
tion and by consuming equipment, supplies, and the time of highly skilled manpower
required to restore good health. The illness, as well as the threatened loss of income
security, may also arouse anxiety and fear in the individual and his family and friends.
These are some of the psychic costs of air pollution-costs that are rarely included in
damage estimates."
FoUTr ANNUAL REPORr OF THE CoUNcIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALTr 76-77 (1974).
215. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
216. The court should balance interests only where legislative judgment is found unrea-
sonable.
"But how are competing interests to be assessed? . ..Full responsibility for the
choice cannot be given to the courts. . . . History teaches that the independence of
the judiciary is jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day
and assume primary responsibility in choosing between competinig political, economic
and social pressures."
"Primary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in this situation
before us of necessity belongs to the Congress. . . . We are to set aside the judgment
of those whose duty it is to legislate only if there is no reasonable basis for it."
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951).
217. The balancing of interests test, particularly within the field of environmental law,
does not question whether the legislation represents the best possible response, rather,
whether it is a reasonable alternative. The court should never examine factors such factors
as pressure from constituents, party interests, compromises that may have played a crucial
role in the enactment of the alternative in question. C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONsTrruTiONAL
INTERPRETATION 133-34 (1978). "The District Court's responsibility for making findings of fact'
certainly does not authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence against the legislature's
conclusion or even to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without convincing
statistics in the record to support it, the legislative viewpoint constitutes nothing more than
what the District Court in this case said was 'pure speculation.'" Firemen v. Chicago R.I. &
Pac. R.R., Co., 393 U.S. at 138-39 (1968).
218. The resources resembled the classical definitions of ferae naturae. see note 185 supra.
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have automatically presumed the environmental legislation to out-
weigh the burden on interstate commerce.219
F. Weight of Burden as a Factor in the Balancing Test
Another consideration in the examination of state and local envi-
ronmental regulations is whether they serve to prohibit or merely
add cost to the transaction of interstate commerce. The effect of the
laws in Kansas Natural Gas and City of Philadelphia was to pro-
hibit interstate shipments.m The Atlantic Richfield Co. and Huron
regulations merely resulted in additional cost to the transaction.
The disparity between the Atlantic Richfield Co. regulation 22' and
the Huron ordinance222 implies that the substantive weight of'added
cost as compared to prohibition in the balancing test is negligible. 23
The nature of the scarce resource is a crucial element of the bal-
ancing test. The resources in Atlantic Richfield Co. and Huron were
attributed no possible commercial value.2 In fact, without govern-
ment intervention, the resources would probably have remained
219. "The ethos of restraint also follows logically from the precept, mentioned before, that
in a democratic society interest-balancing judges should seek to maximize as many claims
as possible. Legislative policy, after all, is the product of majority rule. When legislation
comes to the Court for review and interpretation, presumption should be in its favor because,
having been passed by the majority, it is assumed to maximize more claims and satisfy more
interests. The only alternative would be to thwart democratic rule and extol minority inter-
ests." C. DUCAT, MoDzs oF CONSTrrtmONAL INTmRPwmAioN at 132 (1978) (footnotes omit-
ted)(emphasis added). However, it is essential to recall that the precept upon which this
theory is based rests on the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Jay Burns Baking Co.
v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 534 (1924). See C. DUCAT, MODES OF CONMrrT=rONAL INTzRPRETATON
130 n.30, (1978).
220. Prohibitory state regulations which are patently discriminatory are permitted if they
effect a quarantine or quell fraud. See notes 197 and 202 supra.
221. 435 U.S. at 180 (1978). The added cost was approximately one cent per barrel per
120,000 DWT tanker.
222. 362 U.S. at 441 (1960). A criminal penalty was attached to the Detroit Smoke Abate-
ment Code. Therefore, a shipowner was forced to replace or structurally modify his ships'
engines.
223. In taxation cases falling under the commerce clause, "it is axiomatic that the foun-
ders did not intend to immunize such commerce from carrying its fair share of the costs of
the state government in return for the benefits it derives from within the state." Northwest
Cement Co. v. Minnestoa, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1958). It seems not too outlandish to suggest
that interstate commerce be forced to bear some of the costs of cleaning the state environment
it utilizes. Further, interstate commerce should bear a fair share of the burden of protecting
the state environment from harm should the state legislature choose to so protect the state.
224.. These resources were ferae naturae under Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896),
and were possessed of the right to protection by the state for the benefit of all the state's
residents. See note 185 supra.
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unprotected. City of Philadelphia and Kansas Natural Gas involved
resources environmental in nature, but displaying characteristics
similar to valuable commodities. Based on this similarity, the court
may infer economic protection and discriminatory intent. This will
either preclude the balancing test or obviate the applicability of the
non-comparable benefit test. Local legislation dealing with a sub-
ject of no inherent commercial value may deserve to be placed
within the category of non-comparable benefit. A court failing to
expressly apply a non-comparable benefit test may use the tradi-
tional balancing test to yield the same result.12s
Local legislatures know that preservation of a valuable commod-
ity is tainted by self-protection and they may attempt to avoid this
dilemma by deceptive language."' e The Supreme Court will not
allow protectionist measures on environmental issues to place any
burden on interstate commerce regardless of the "currently fashion-
able garb of environmental legislation" in which the law is
wrapped.m
Where the facts illustrate a purely health or aesthetic purpose
behind the legislation, the balancing test should be fairly be applied
in favor of the environmental legislation.2 8 When there are multiple
purposes behind a piece of legislation, courts have a more difficult
task deciding whether the legislation exhibits a truly non-
comparable benefit. 221 The court is faced with the dilemma of allow-
ing quasi-economic legislation to stand with the strength of purely
environmental. legislation, or assuming a non-judicial function by
assigning certain weights to specific benefits of the statute. 230
225. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Huron Portland Cement Co.
v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
226. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 625-26.
227. Id.
228. The prerequisite is, of course, that the legislation bear a reasonable relation to the
problem. See Firemen v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968); South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 191 (1938). See also C. DUCAT, MODES
OF CONSTITTIONAL INTERPRETATION 132-33 (1978).
229. See C. DuCAT, MODES OF CONSTrrrMONAL INTERPRETATION 133-34. It is argued that
these factors should not be a part of a court's determination.
230. Although the court will examine extraneous factors, unless non-environmental (or
non-health and safety) objectives so taint the legislation to make it patently unreasonable,
the law will be upheld. In practice, far more state legislation fails on the grounds of "need
for uniform regulation" or "discrimination" than ever reach an interest balancing test. Excep-
tions, however, do exist. The Court recognized the relative scarcity of these cases in Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). "This is one of those cases-few in num-
ber-where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional bur-
19791
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G. Alternatives to the Non-comparable Benefit Test
An Oregon court ingeniously created an alternative to the non-
comparable benefit test in deciding that an Oregon law banning
pull-top cans, non-refundable bottles and cans, and establishing a
system of return stations throughout the state did not violate the
commerce clause.21 The court in American Can Co. v. Oregon Li-
quor Control Commission22 examined the need for uniform regula-
tion and possibility of discrimination concluding that the statute
could not be held unconstitutional on those grounds. Accordingly,
a balancing test was applied.23
The environmental and economic objectives of the law were inex-
tricably intertwined. The Liquor Control Commission contended
that the only purpose of the legislation was non-comparable, to stop
the litter inundating the state. 23' The benefit of litter-free highways
was comparable since the task of cleaning up the litter was a mea-
surable expense borne by all Oregon residents. 235 American Can Co.
contended that the bottle bill was motivated by protectionists inter-
ests which discriminated against interstate commerce and resulted
in more revenue and jobs for Oregon and its residents231 This allega-
tion of self-interest against the state was insufficient to render the
law an unreasonable burden of interstate commerce. The minor
market fluctuations related to interstate commerce were interpreted
by American Can as a necessary by-product of constantly evolving
community priorities.237
den on interstate commerce." Id. at 529. The paucity of cases in which the Court has applied
an interest balancing test has been a relevant factor in the lack of definitive guidelines as to
when interests may be weighed without a court's encroaching on a legislative function.
231. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691
(1973). See Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 7 ERC 2083 (Md. Ct. App. 1975) where a city
ordinance requiring a five cent deposit on all soft drink and beer containers was held not to
violate the commerce clause.
232. Id., 517 P.2d 691 (1973).
233. 15 Or. App at 635-36, 517 P.2d at 699-700.
234. Id. at 628, 517 P.2d at 696.
235. Id. at 641-42, 517, P.2d at 702-03. This logic could easily be applied to all cases that
pass the "need for uniform regulation" and "discrimination" tests. In Atlantic Richfield, the
cost of cleaning the beaches in the event of an oil spill would clearly outweigh the one cent
per barrel of oil a 120,000 DWT tanker would be forced to pay for a state-licensed pilot. See
note 221 supra.
236. 15 Or. App. at 639-42, 517 P.2d at 701-03.
237. Id. at 628, 517 P.2d 696. The Court remained unsympathetic to the company's plight,
stating, "Uj]ust as there were gainers and losers, with plaintiff [American Can Co.] among
the gainers, when the industry adapted to the development of non-returnable containers,
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A balancing test may be applied to economic benefits due to the
ease of assigning to them a dollar value."' Thus, the purpose of the
statute becomes crucial once the court applies a balancing test. The
court in City of Philadelphia did not discuss the non-comparable
benefit rule, but stated that, under the police power, "New Jersey
has every right to protect its residents' interests as well as their
environment.""23  While this is true, there is a clear tactical disad-
vantage in conceding the existence of an economic benefit for the
purposes of a commerce clause balancing test. 40
This purely economic formula would seem to be a solution to the
problem of non-comparable benefits by denying their existence. The
court in American Can recognized the economics on both sides of
the situation 2 ' and could have concluded at this point that, in pre-
cise dollar value, the cost of cleaning highways outweighed the cost
of relocating factories. The American Can court, however, refused
to assume a legislative function, simply allowing the statute to
stand absent any discrimination or need for uniform rule. Courts
have generally avoided open application of non-comparable benefit
criteria to the commerce clause balancing test.
V. Conclusion
The ultimate question is whether environmental law will be di-
rected by federal or local government. The two most recent cases
striking down local regulation2 2 arguably indicia of a trend to re-
there will be new gainers and losers as they adapt to the ban." However, the stereotypic image
of business fighting environmental clean-up is rapidly changing. Most obvious among these
are tax incentives for environmental programs. See I.R.C. § 169. See also note 40 supra. Often
environmental regulations yield unexpected financial benefits. In creating the "cleanest and
most modern" steel-making facilitiy in the United States, Kaiser Steel Corporation invested
$233 million in its Fontana, California plant. This followed a $2.1 million fine for non-
compliance with pollution violations. Modernization of operations at the new plant precipi-
tated an annual increase of 400,000 tons of steel. N.Y. Times, February 14, 1979. § D, at 1,
col. 2.
238. See note 214 supra.
239. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). The Court never had
to come to any conclusion of relative weight since the New Jersey regulation was invalidated
for its discrimination against interstate commerce, thus precluding the application of a bal-
ancing test.
240. Public health legislation admitting of desire by the state to gain a distinct competi-
tive advantage over sister states will be held violative of the commerce clause. H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
241. See note 235 supra.
242. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
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move environmental problems from the control of local government.
A better interpretation of these supremacy and commerce clause
cases would reveal a trend in the diametrically opposite direction:
The Supreme Court will invalidate local regulations only where
there is a clear violation of Constitutional or federal law.
In cases of federal pre-emption, the local law will stand if (1) it is
not expressly pre-empted, (2) it is not impliedly pre-empted and (3)
it does not exceed express limits on permissible exercise of local
power set in the federal law. Where the commerce clause is allegedly
violated, the local law will be held invalid if it discriminates against
interstate commerce or enters a field demanding uniform federal
regulation. 'The local law will be upheld in the absence of such
blatant violations.
In Atlantic Richfield, when one portion of the state law was pre-
empted, a distinction was drawn to allow the remainder of that
section to stand.243 Similarly, sections of the Washington law in
Atlantic Richfield potentially pre-empted by delegation of the prob-
lem to a federal agency were only pre-empted when that agency had
actually taken action."' Where the federal agency failed to act, pre-
emption did not exist. '45 In City of Philadelphia, the state law was
held to be violative of the commerce clause due to overt discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce."'
Recent developments247 have made almost every citizen aware of
243. See text accompanying notes 112-121 supra.
244. See text accompanying notes 134-139 supra.
245. See text accompanying notes 130-133 supra.
246. See text accompanying notes 190-198 supra.
247. On March 28, 1979, an accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania imperiled the lives of thousands and caused fear throughout the
nation. Schools were closed; pregnant women and pre-school children were ordered out of the
danger area. Thousands of others voluntarily evacuated. Plant owners lost approximately
$400,000 every day the plant was closed; moreover, there was no estimate on when the plant
would be fit to reopen. The President visited the plant as scientists analyzed a potentially
explosive hydrogen bubble at the tope of the reactor vessel. Anti-nuclear protest rallies were
held throughout the nation. NEWSWEEK, April 19, 1979, at 24-45. Ayers, Three Mile Island:
Notes from a Nightmare, N.Y. Times, April 16, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1.
248. "It [Three Mile Island] was an accident destined to threaten not only the lives of
thousands, born and unborn, but also the future of nuclear power itself-an accident that
would generate a week of doomsday fear, panicky flight, conflicting statements, noisy demon-
strations and intense confusion." Id., April 16, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 2. "The size of the anti-
nuclear reaction is already creating a new and unexpected pressure on politicians. In Califor-
nia, . . . Governor Jerry Brown has called for the shutting down of the Rancho Seco plant in
the Sacramento Valley until it can be proven safe. . . .We look forward to joining dozens of
anti-nuclear organizations in an effort to tie together a powerful citizen's movement that can
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the impact of environmental legislation upon his life. The public's
fears may be the basis for a grass-roots movement to shift control
from the federal to local government control on the assumption that
local legislators will better protect the citizens' interests. "8 A battle
for local control will be fought for control of nuclear power plants.'"
Contrary to the perceived Supreme Court trend are decisons of fed-
eral courts holding local nuclear regulation invalid.2 10
A recent decision in the area is Pacific Legal Foundation v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission2'
where a state regulation was pre-empted despite the existence of a
clause in the federal act expressly tolerating local action in a limited
area. 5 ' The local law was interpreted as contravening Congressional
goals and operation in other sections of the federal act. 53 The At-
omic Energy Act ' 5 created guidelines for federal control of nuclear
power. Later amendments delegated to the states control over
"activities for purposes other than protection against radiation haz-
ards. '"25' The federal government retained control over operation
and construction of nuclear installations and disposal of nuclear
waste. ' The state enacted a de facto ban on nuclear power plants
lacking state-approved waste storage and disposal facilities. 5 The
regulation was ostensibly based on fiscal motives, with io more than
a tangential concern for "radiation hazard.12 8
The court was unimpressed with the state's ability to fabricate
purposes separate from those of Congress in order to avoid pre-
break the back of the utility-government nuclear lobby. ... Fonda, Hayden, Mobilizing
Against the Nukes, NEW YORK, April 16, 1979, at 43.
249. There are already several cases on the issue of local control over nuclear power. See
Nothern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S.
1035 (1972); United States v. City of New York, No. 77-3485 (S.D.N.Y. December 26, 1978);
Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, No. 78-
711-E (S.D.Cal. March 6, 1979).
250. See note 249 supra.
251. No. 78-711-E (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979).
252. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
253. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation Dev. Comm'n,
No.78-711-E, slip op. at 19-20 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979).
254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1976).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c) (1976).
257. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
No. 78-711-E, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979). See Tribe, California Declines the
Nuclear Gamble': Is Such a State Choice Preempted?, 7 Ecology L.Q. 679, 683 (1979).
258. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
No. 78-711-E, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979).
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emption.25' At a superficial level, the court's analysis is sound, but
an in depth examination reveals flaws in the court's finding of pre-
emption. Express pre-emption was not found by the court.6 0 Con-
gress made no statement of express pre-emption in the Atomic En-
ergy Act, placing the court on solid ground when it observed that
the state regulation could still be pre-empted "by implication."',
The court also noted that actual conflict with a federal law will pre-
empt state regulation."'2 Based on these definition of pre-emption by
implication263 and by conflict, 2"1 the court held the state law pre-
empted on both grounds." 5
Proponents of the state regulation sought to distinguish the pur-
pose of the federal law from that of the state regulation; however,
the argument was rejected. 6 The danger of conceding the validity
of this purpose was clear to the court. 267 The court's finding that
259. Id. "The underlying premise seems to be that any sort of regulation at all is permissi-
ble as long as a state is willing and ingenious enough to conjure up a legislative purpose other
than radiation control." Id., slip op. at 13. Questions of fiscal soundness should not be
dismissed lightly. During the Three Mile Island accident, see note 247 supra, "the utility was
losing perhaps $400,000 every day the plant was down. 'And it will be a long time [before]
it ever runs again,' predicted NRC official G.N. Lauben." NEWSWEEK, April 9, 1979, at 30. A
nuclear power plant near New York City "has been shut down since 1974, when Con Edison
declined to develop a costly new emergency core-cooling system now demanded by the federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission . . . ." NEW YORK, April 16, 1979, at 39. "While agreeing
that agriculture products-particularly milk-would have to be monitored for a radius of 50
miles from a nuclear accident . . ., nuclear officials are not entirely in sympathy with those
who claim long-range bad effects from low-level radiation. Id., April 16, 1979, at 40.
260. Id., slip op. at 10.
261. Id., slip op. at 10-11 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947)).
262. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
No. 78-711-E, slip op. at 11 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979) (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)). The court noted two separate tests for conflict pre-emption, id.,
slip op. at 11, (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963), and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The tests seem indistinguishable.
Also, in Atlantic Richfield, the state law was enacted in the absence of any Congressional
tolerance of state regulation. Regulations on oil tankers were pre-empted only where they
conflicted with the actual exercise of federal power. In the instant case, pre-emption is based
on prospective exercise of federal power where Congress under the Atomic Energy Act has
expressly addressed the issue of pre-emption.
263. Examined in this Comment at text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
264. Examined in this Comment at text accompanying notes 65-131 supra.
265. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Conservation & Dev. Comm'n., No. 78-711-
E, slip op. at 10-20. (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979).
266. Id., slip op. at 13.
267. "If section 2021(k) is broadly interpreted to validate any state statute or regulation
as long as there appears a stated purpose other than protection against radiation hazard, then
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Congress did not intend for a state to inhibit any federal action
effectively nullified state power under the Atomic Energy Act. 268
The court's application of the principles of implied pre-emption
is unsound. When implied pre-emption is alleged, the court must
discern the intent of Congress to pre-empt local regulation based on
a total absence of guidelines within the federal law.26 The clearest
example of implied pre-emption occurred in City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 270 wherein the total absence of a state-
ment on pre-emption in the federal act precipitated an examination
of legislative intent. Congressional intent has since been examined
to support allegations of conflict pre-emption,272 not to substantiate
implied pre-emption. Where Congress has expressly granted local
government power to act in an area, it is impossible to infer implied
pre-emption from the nature of the statute.27 3 Implied pre-emption
must be denied because Congress has addressed the issue of local
action.
The most persuasive argument for pre-emption is made in the
conflict of operation category. The Pacific Legal Foundation inter-
pretation of this issue, however, evidences a major oversight, As-
suming, as the court does,"' the state regulation is valid, conflict of
actual operation must be found. 275 The argument for conflict of oper-
ation is clearly set forth in the opinion. 276 Congress has made a
decision to encourage development of nuclear energy which may be
frustrated by state regulation. 217
The argument against pre-emption may be based on Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. City of Detroit. 278 Detroit was allowed by federal
the States would effectively be permitted to intrude into the preempted sphere and regulate
radiation hazard under the guise of a permitted legislative purpose." Id., slip op. at 14.
268. Id., slip op. at 14.
269. See text accompanying notes 48-64 supra.
270. 411 U.S. 624 (1973). Lockheed was not discussed in Pacific Legal Foundation.
271. Id. at 633.
272. See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Huron
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Askew and Huron were not discussed in
Pacific Legal Foundation.
273. See text accompanying notes 65-89 supra.
274. Pacific Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
No. 78-711-E, slip op. at 17 (S.D. Cal. March 6, 1979).
275. This was the same procedure used to seek pre-emption in Askew and in Huron,
although neither case is cited or distinguished in Pacific Legal Foundation.
276. Id., slip op. at 14-20.
277. Id., slip op. at 18. See 42 U.S.C. 2022-2012 (1976).
278. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). Huron was not discussed or distinguished in Pacific Legal
Foundation.
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law to enact stringent air pollution regulations which directly su-
perseded, federal ship licensing legislation. The conflict of operation
was permitted based on "recognition of the dangers to the public
health and welfare, injury to agricultural crops and livestock, dam-
age to and deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground
transportation, from air pollution . "..."279 Similarly, no conflict
should be found between subsections of the Atomic Energy Act.
Huron allows a local regulation expressly permitted by the federal
government to defeat a coexisting federal regulation without fear of
pre-emption. s0
Local regulation of nuclear power which does avoid pre-emption,
may not be valid on other grounds. If a sufficiently strong argument
may be made for uniform federal regulation"8 ' or discrimination
against interstate commerce, 82 the local law would be held violative
of the commerce clause.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey held that no state may dis-
criminate against interstate transportion of waste.2 3 Given that
Congress intends to encourage development of nuclear energy and
dangerous waste is a necessary by-product of such power, no one
state should be allowed to set higher standards for its safe disposal.
Refusal by a state to approve nuclear waste disposal procedures will
inevitably result in disposal of waste in neighboring states. City of
Philadelphia denied states the right to lock out waste, therefore, the
commerce clause should prohibit states from forcing waste on sister
states.
A totally different issue is raised, however, where the actual trans-
279. Id. at 445 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1857 (1960)).
280. "The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not immunize a ship from
the operation of the normal incidents of local police power, not constituting a direct regulation
of commerce." Id. at 447. The offending ships in Huron were granted a license to operate, as
are nuclear power plants under 42 U.S.C. § 2021(c), yet, the federal license did not constitute
an immunity to police power regulation permitted by Congress.
281. While the merits of local and federal legislation in this area have yet to be litigated,
it is recognized that the national security and uniform standards present compelling argu-
ments for federal control. However, the right of area residents to have a voice in nuclear power
plant siting and operation should not be discounted. Furthermore, in the Three Mile Island
mishap, see note 247 supra., the Nuclear Regulatory Commission failed to prove its superior
ability to handle the emergency. On March 30, 1979, the Commission chairman stated that
he and the Governor of Pennsylvania lacked crucial information and were "like a couple of
blind men staggering around." On April 1, 1979, the President visited the nuclear plant while
it was in a potentially explosive condition. N.Y. Times, April 15, 1979, § E, at 3, col. 1.
282. See text accompanying notes 176-204 supra.
283. 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
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portation of the matter is dangerous. If this can be proven,2"' even
overt discrimination under the commerce clause is permissible.8 5
No simple solution exists for a conciliation of competing interests
seeking control over environmental regulation. In the end, either the
Supreme Court or Congress will balance the merits of both sides and
determine whether federal or local control will best suit the environ-
mental needs of the nation in the future.
Mark J. Alonso
284. Id. at 628-29. See Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S.
137 (1902).
285. "Nuclear fuel is manufactured at sites that may be far from the nuclear plants that
use it, and it must be carried to its destination by truck or train. Similarly, the spent fuel
removed from the reactor core is still highly radioactive, and in many cases must be carried,
along with contaminated clothing and equipment, to distant sites for disposal. NEWSWEEK,
April 9, 1979, at 39.
In March, 1979, a truck carrying radioactive nuclear fuel "overturned in Washington releas-
ing some radiation." Id., April 9, 1979, at 39. On January 28, 1979, a truck carrying 40,000
pounds of cobalt 60 and cesium 137 overturned spilling and breaking open forty-six drums of
the nuclear waste. N.Y. Times, § A, at 12, col. 6.

